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ENFORCEMENT OF PATENT RIGHTS:
EXPANDING THE POTENTIAL FOR




IN Tyco Healthcare Group v. Mutual Pharmaceutical, the U.S. Courtof Appeals for the Federal Circuit broadened the avenues by whichpatent owners may be found liable under antitrust laws when at-
tempting to enforce their patent rights against competitors.1 Although the
Federal Circuit addressed four antitrust counterclaims by a patent in-
fringement defendant, this Note argues that through two of those coun-
terclaims the court improperly burdens patent owners who are
attempting to enforce their patents against infringing competitors.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Tyco Healthcare Group LP (“Tyco”) owns patents on the formulations
and uses of the brand-name drug Restoril, generically entitled
temazepam, which is used to treat insomnia.2 Mutual Pharmaceutical
Company, Inc. (“Mutual”) sought to produce a generic version of
Restoril.3 Tyco’s patents claim a formulation of temazepam with a spe-
cific surface area (“SSA”) between 0.65 and 1.1 square meters per gram
(m2/g).4 The patent claims do not recite a method to measure the SSA,
but the specifications explain that measurements are made according to
the standard Brunauer, Emmet, and Teller procedure (“B.E.T.”).5 To
perform the measurement, the sample is outgassed (gas and vapor are
removed from the surface of the sample).6 The particular outgassing tem-
* Angela M. Oliver is a J.D. Candidate 2016, at SMU Dedman School of Law. She
received a B.S.I. in Bioinformatics in 2012 from Baylor University. Special thanks to my
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1. See Tyco Healthcare Grp. v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 762 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
2. Id. at 1340.
3. Id. at 1341.
4. Id. at 1340.
5. Id.; see generally, Brunauer et al., Adsorption of Gases in Multimolecular Layers,
60 J. AM. CHEM. SOC. (ISSUE 2) 309 (1938) (describing the B.E.T. procedure).
6. Tyco Healthcare, 762 F.3d at 1340.
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perature used may affect the final measurement—specifically, a tempera-
ture too high may physically alter the sample by softening or melting it.7
Tyco measured the SSA of Restoril with an outgassing temperature of
105 °C.8 Mutual, however, used an outgassing temperature of 40 °C when
testing its generic version of temazepam.9 The parties agreed that the
SSA of Mutual’s temazepam fell within the SSA range specified in Tyco’s
patent claims when the outgassing temperature was 105 °C.10 However,
evidence indicated that Mutual’s drug fell in the infringing range only
because the high temperature (105 °C) physically altered the chemical,
which decreased the SSA .11 Also, Mutual’s expert claimed that a lower
outgassing temperature underestimates SSA.12 If true, this would have
indicated that Mutual’s measurements (2.2 m2/g at 40 °C) point away
from infringement; anything greater than 2.2 m2/g still falls outside the
claimed range of 0.65 to 1.1 m2/g.13
Mutual provided the FDA an Abbreviated New Drug Application
(“ANDA”) to gain approval for manufacturing and selling a generic ver-
sion of temazepam.14 Mutual’s ANDA claimed the generic drug would
have an SSA of at least 2.2 m2/g—far greater than the SSA claimed in
Tyco’s patents (0.65–1.1 m2/g).15 Mutual certified to the FDA that its ge-
neric drug was not protected by any U.S. patents—indicating under “Par-
agraph IV” that the relevant existing patents were either invalid or that
the generic product would not infringe.16 Mutual notified Tyco of its
ANDA, as required,17 and explained that the generic drug would not in-
fringe the Restoril patents because of the different SSA values.18
III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Upon learning of Mutual’s ANDA application, Tyco sued Mutual alleg-
ing the ANDA infringed Tyco’s patents under the special infringement
provision of the Hatch-Waxman Act.19 Mutual counterclaimed alleging
antitrust violations, which the district court stayed until it could resolve
the infringement issue.20 As required, the FDA stayed approval of the
ANDA.21 In August 2009, the district court found Mutual did not infringe
Tyco’s ’954 Patent (Tyco’s other patents had expired and were no longer
at issue). The court held that because the SSA listed in the ANDA was
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1341.
9. Id. at 1342.
10. Id. at 1345.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 1345.
13. Id. at 1341, 1345.
14. Id. at 1341.
15. Id.
16. Id.; see 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) (2012).
17. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B).
18. Tyco Healthcare, 762 F.3d at 1341.
19. Id.; see 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A) (2012).
20. Tyco Healthcare, 762 F.3d at 1341.
21. See id.; 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
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outside the range claimed in the ’954 Patent, the ANDA “directly ad-
dresse[d] the issue of infringement” and, thus, a “product manufactured
to the ANDA’s specifications could not literally infringe the  ’954
Patent.”22
The day after the non-infringement decision, Tyco filed a citizen peti-
tion with the FDA, urging the FDA to amend its criteria for determining
the bioequivalence of proposed generic temazepam products to ensure
those products were therapeutically equivalent to Restoril.23 In its peti-
tion, Tyco advocated for the use of more extensive pharmacokinetic pa-
rameters to demonstrate bioequivalence.24 In September 2009, with
Tyco’s citizen suit still pending, the FDA approved Mutual’s ANDA, al-
lowing Mutual to market its generic version of temazepam.25 Five months
later, the FDA denied Tyco’s citizen petition.26
In May 2010, the district court granted summary judgment for Mutual
on its invalidity counterclaim, finding Tyco’s ’954 patent claims obvious.27
The Federal Circuit affirmed.28 The district court then lifted the stay of
Mutual’s antitrust counterclaims and granted summary judgment to
Tyco.29
The court found Tyco did not violate any antitrust laws, noting that: (1)
Tyco’s infringement claim was not a sham; (2) it was reasonable for Tyco
to have expected its patent claims to withstand a validity challenge; (3)
Tyco’s citizen petition was not a sham because it was an administrative
petition rather than litigation; and (4) Tyco was not subject to antitrust
liability for fraud.30 In this case, Mutual appealed from that court’s sum-
mary judgment decision.31
IV. LEGAL LANDSCAPE
Patent owners may face antitrust liability under § 2 of the Sherman Act
in certain circumstances.32 If found liable for antitrust violations, a party
22. Tyco Healthcare Grp. v. Mut. Pharm. Co., No. 07-1299 (SRC), 2009 WL 2422382,
at *1-8 (D.N.J. Aug. 4, 2009).
23. Tyco Healthcare, 762 F.3d at 1341.
24. Id. at 1341-42.
25. Id. at 1342; see also U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Drugs@FDA: FDA Ap-
proved Drug Products, FDA.GOV, http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/drugsatfda/in
dex.cfm?fuseaction=Search.Set_Current_Drug&ApplNo=078581&DrugName=TEMAZE
PAM&ActiveIngred=TEMAZEPAM&SponsorApplicant=MUTUAL%20PHARM&Pro
ductMktStatus=1&goto=Search.DrugDetails (last visited Oct.23, 2014).
26. Tyco Healthcare, 762 F.3d at 1342; see also Letter from Janet Woodcock, M.D.,
Director, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, Food and Drug Administration, to
David B. Clissold (February 2010), available at http://orangebookblog.typepad.com/files/
fda_cder_to_hyman_phelps_and_mcnamara_p_c_-_petition_denial.pdf.
27. Tyco Healthcare Grp. v. Mut. Pharm. Co., No. 07–1299 (SRC), 2010 WL 1799457,
at *9 (D.N.J. May 5, 2010).
28. Tyco Healthcare Grp. v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 642 F.3d 1370, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
29. Tyco Healthcare, 762 F.3d at 1342.
30. Id. at 1342-43.
31. Id. at 1340.
32. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (“Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopo-
lize . . . any part of the trade or commerce . . . shall be deemed guilty of a felony.”).
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may owe treble damages.33 Noerr-Pennington immunity traditionally pro-
tects parties from antitrust liability for filing suit against a competitor,
based on the right rooted in the First Amendment to petition the govern-
ment for redress.34 A few limited exceptions to Noerr-Pennington immu-
nity exist. Most notably, a party surrenders Noerr-Pennington immunity if
its lawsuit is a sham.35 In Professional Real Estate Investors v. Columbia
Pictures Industries (“PRE”), the Supreme Court developed a two-part
test to evaluate whether a lawsuit is a sham: (1) the action must be “ob-
jectively baseless in the sense that no reasonable litigant could realisti-
cally expect success on the merits”; and (2) if the objective prong is met,
the litigation must conceal a subjective attempt “to interfere directly with
the business relationships of a competitor.”36 Under the first prong, the
Court emphasized that “[t]he existence of probable cause to institute le-
gal proceedings precludes a finding that an antitrust defendant has en-
gaged in sham litigation.”37 In City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor
Advertising, Inc., the Court further explained the sham exception focuses
on “us[ing] the governmental process—as opposed to the outcome of that
process—as an anticompetitive weapon.”38 Courts determine whether a
lawsuit is a sham based on the reasonableness of bringing the action at
the time it was filed.39
As applied to patent law, the Federal Circuit has held patent owners
relinquish Noerr-Pennington immunity when they sue to enforce a patent
they know is invalid or not infringed, with an anti-competitive intent.40
Specifically, in C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Systems, Inc., the Federal Circuit
extended PRE’s generic sham litigation test to determine whether a pat-
ent infringement suit constitutes sham litigation.41 Previously, some
courts had used what is known as the Handgards line of cases from the
Ninth Circuit when determining whether an attempt to enforce patent
rights constituted an antitrust violation.42 Under the Handgards deci-
sions, an antitrust plaintiff must prove by “clear and convincing evidence”
that the patent owner brought the infringement suit in bad faith.43 The
33. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2012).
34. See E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 138
(1961) (protecting the right to petition government); United Mine Workers v. Pennington,
381 U.S. 657, 669–70 (1965) (extending Noerr immunity to petitioning executive officials);
Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510–11 (1972) (extending
immunity to petitioning administrative agencies and courts).
35. See Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49,
60–61 (1993) (“PRE”).
36. Id. at 60-61 (internal quotation marks omitted).
37. Id. at 62.
38. City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 380 (1991).
39. FilmTec Corp. v. Hydranautics, 67 F.3d 931, 938 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
40. C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
41. Id. at 1368-69.
42. Handgards v. Ethicon, Inc., 743 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1984) (“Handgards II”);
Handgards v. Ethicon, Inc., 601 F.2d 986 (9th Cir. 1979) (“Handgards I”); see, e.g., Vaughn
Co. v. Global Bio-Fuels Tech., LLC, No. 1:12-CV-1292, 2013 WL 5755389, at *8 (N.D.N.Y.
Oct. 23, 2013) (applying Handgards II).
43. Handgards II, 743 F.2d at 1294 (citation omitted).
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Ninth Circuit’s decisions indicated such a heightened burden of proof
would comport with the statutory presumption of patent validity.44
Furthermore, in the context of pharmaceutical patents, in Glaxo, Inc. v.
Novopharm, Ltd., the Federal Circuit indicated that § 271(e)(2) of the
Hatch-Waxman Act focuses the infringement inquiry on “what is likely to
be sold following FDA approval.”45 Later in Bayer AG v. Elan Pharma-
ceutical Research Corp., the Federal Circuit confirmed that a patent
owner may reasonably expect a successful infringement outcome—even
though an ANDA application describes a drug with a characteristic
preventing the drug from infringing on the patent owner’s claims—if the
drug the generic company will likely market will infringe.46
V. ANALYSIS
The Federal Circuit addressed each of Mutual’s four antitrust counter-
claims in turn. I address two of those counterclaims here. Regarding Mu-
tual’s claim that Tyco’s infringement suit was sham litigation, the Federal
Circuit found it “not unreasonable for a patent owner to allege infringe-
ment under section 271(e)(2)(A) if the patent owner has evidence that
the as-marketed commercial ANDA product will infringe, even though
the hypothetical product specified in the ANDA could not infringe.”47
However, the court indicated that antitrust liability would attach if Tyco’s
factual theory of infringement—the effect of outgassing temperatures on
the SSA—turned out to be objectively baseless and if Tyco’s conduct sat-
isfied the subjective prong of the PRE test.48
Regarding Mutual’s claim that Tyco’s validity defense was a sham, the
court briefly recognized the “presumption of patent validity” and the pat-
ent challenger’s burden to prove invalidity by clear and convincing evi-
dence.49 However, the court then extended potential antitrust liability to
a patent owner’s validity defense if the defense satisfied the PRE test by
allowing “a patentee’s assertion of its patent in the face of a claim of
invalidity” to be found “so unreasonable as to support a claim that the
patentee has engaged in sham litigation.”50 In this case, because Mutual
failed to contest the evidence Tyco presented in defense of validity, the
court found Tyco’s validity defense to be legitimate.51 Thus, the court af-
firmed the summary judgment in favor of Tyco on the invalidity aspect of
Mutual’s sham litigation counterclaim.52
44. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2012) (indicating the burden to prove invalidity rests on the
party asserting invalidity); Handgards I, 601 F.2d at 996.
45. Glaxo, Inc. v. Novopharm, Ltd., 110 F.3d 1562, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
46. Bayer AG v. Elan Pharm. Research Corp., 212 F.3d 1241, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
47. Tyco Healthcare Grp. v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 762 F.3d 1338, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
48. Id. at 1345.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1345-46.
51. Id. at 1346-47.
52. Id. at 1347.
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In her dissent, Judge Newman accused the majority of inserting “a
strong antitrust presence into routine patent litigation” by “adding the
potential of antitrust penalties for patent enforcement.”53 She highlighted
the Supreme Court’s language in Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health &
Fitness, Inc. regarding the “chilling effect” of antitrust liability: “The
threat of antitrust liability . . . far more significantly chills the exercise of
the right to petition than does the mere shifting of attorney’s fees.”54 Re-
garding potential antitrust liability for defending a patent’s validity, the
dissent accused the majority of creating a new antitrust dimension—a
patent owner must now provide affirmative evidence of validity of its pat-
ent, and if such evidence is “objectively baseless,” then the patent owner
violates antitrust law.55
Although the court applied the generic PRE test to the sham litigation
claim and then extended the test to apply to a patent owner’s validity
defense, the court failed to articulate the appropriate burden of proof to
satisfy each prong of the PRE test. At least one district court has aptly
noted this gap in the Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence.56 Throughout its
opinion, the court conveniently ignored the well-established Handgards
line of cases, which does articulate an appropriate burden of proof. The
Ninth Circuit’s decisions in Handgards espouse a more finessed approach
to sham litigation in patent law by emphasizing the statutory presumption
of patent validity by requiring that the “bad faith” of the patent owner be
established by clear and convincing evidence.57 The two approaches—
Handgards and PRE—are not mutually exclusive. Some district courts
have successfully blended the two tests by using the clear and convincing
evidence standard of Handgards when applying the PRE test.58The Fed-
eral Circuit, meanwhile, has indicated in just one unpublished decision
that a clear and convincing evidence standard applies to the objective
prong of the PRE test.59 In that case, because the objective prong was not
satisfied, the court did not address the subjective prong—or the eviden-
tiary standard required to satisfy that prong.60 If the Federal Circuit in-
53. Id. at 1351 (Newman, J., dissenting).
54. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
55. Id. at 1353.
56. In re Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litig., Civil Action No. 08-2431, 2012 1657734, at *5
(E.D. Pa. May 11, 2012) (noting that “[t]he Federal Circuit has not clarified in a published
decision whether the clear and convincing evidence standard required to show objective
baselessness in preemption cases also applies in the sham exception context”).
57. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2012); Handgards v. Ethicon, Inc., 601 F.2d 986, 996 (9th Cir.
1979).
58. See, e.g., Vaughan Co. v. Global Bio-Fuels Tech., LLC, No. 1:12-CV-1292, 2013
WL 5755389, at *8 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2013) (citing In re DDAVP Direct Purchaser Anti-
trust Litig., 585 F.3d 677, 694 (2d Cir. 2009), which applied the PRE test); Honeywell Int’l,
Inc. v. Universal Avionics Sys. Corp., 343 F. Supp. 2d 272, 325 (D. Del. 2004) (referencing
the Handgards decisions and requiring clear and convincing evidence to satisfy each prong
of the PRE analysis).
59. Mitek Surgical Prods., Inc. v. Arthrex, Inc., Nos. 99-1004, 99-1034, 2000 WL
217637, at *4 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 22, 2000) (stating whether a claim is objectively baseless must
be proved by clear and convincing evidence).
60. Id.
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tends to increase the potential for patent owners to face antitrust liability
when attempting to enforce their patent rights, the Court should, at the
very least, require an antitrust plaintiff to prove each PRE prong accord-
ing to the high evidentiary burden found in Handgards—clear and con-
vincing evidence.
Furthermore, even under the generic PRE approach, the Federal Cir-
cuit seemed to ignore PRE’s “probable cause” language—that the “exis-
tence of probable cause to institute legal proceedings precludes a finding
that an antitrust defendant has engaged in sham litigation.”61 While the
court made a point to recognize it is not unreasonable to bring suit if the
as-marketed product is likely to infringe (which some evidence here
seemed to indicate),62 the court apparently expected the patent owner to
fully vet its theory of infringement before the court would find sufficient
probable cause.63 Given the requirement that a patent owner has just 45
days to file suit after receiving notice of a potentially infringing ANDA
(or else the ANDA will become effective immediately),64 the factual bur-
den to show “probable cause” should be low—and certainly should be
more lenient than what the court implied in this decision.
Now consider Tyco’s alleged sham patent validity defense. Although
the Federal Circuit found Tyco’s evidence in this case sufficient to avoid
antitrust liability, the court made it possible for patent owners to face
liability if a court finds their evidence supporting the validity of their pat-
ents to be insufficient to some degree.65 The court, however, claimed this
possibility will be a “rare case.”66 Nevertheless, this additional avenue for
potential antitrust liability severely changes the stakes for patent owners
seeking to enforce their patents. The consequences of insufficient validity
evidence prior to this decision focused on the loss of patent rights—not
the loss of rights plus antitrust liability with treble damages.67
Ultimately, placing additional risk of antitrust liability on patent own-
ers results in an unnecessary threat of punishment. For the rare case in
which a patent owner brings a meritless action in bad faith, other reme-
dies exist. First, an infringement defendant claiming bad faith on the part
of the patent owner may find relief through state law malicious prosecu-
tion claims.68 In fact, the Ninth Circuit specifically left open this possibil-
ity when it refused to make patent owners immune from such state
claims.69 Furthermore, the Supreme Court recently broadened the in-
stances in which attorney fees can be awarded based on “exceptional”
61. See Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. 508 U.S. 49,
62-63 (1993).
62. Tyco Healthcare Grp. v. Mut Pharm. Co., 762 F.3d 1338, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
63. See PRE, 508 U.S. at 62.
64. 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(C) (2012).
65. Tyco Healthcare, 762 F.3d at 1345-46.
66. Id.
67. See id. at 1350-51, 1353 (Newman, J., dissenting).
68. U.S. Aluminum Corp./Texas v. Alumax, Inc., 831 F.2d 878, 881 (9th Cir. 1987).
69. Id.
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conduct by a patent owner.70 The Court even noted that “a case present-
ing either subjective bad faith or exceptionally meritless claims
may . . . warrant a fee award.”71 Additional antitrust punishment for at-
tempting to enforce patent rights is excessive.
The Federal Circuit’s decision in Tyco Healthcare will result in increas-
ingly complex patent litigation suits. An accused patent infringer now has
a strong incentive to counterclaim with a Sherman Act violation at every
opportunity—especially with treble damages on the line. Such a continual
injection of antitrust principles into the historically distinct realm of pat-
ent law will continue to undermine confidence in patents, ultimately
harming the “Progress of Science and useful Arts.”72
70. Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1757 (2014).
71. Id. at 1757 (emphasis added).
72. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
